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initiate this process? In very general terms, the Canadian rules of judicial jurisdiction provide the plaintiff 
with three options for jurisdiction acquisition. First, the jurisdiction can be acquired based on explicit 
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Second, the plaintiff can initiate the litigation in the forum that has the so-called “real and substantial 
connection” between it and the parties’ specific interaction under the given ground of liability (i.e., tort, 




Creative Commons License 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 
License. 
Cover Page Footnote 
I am indebted to Professor Frederick Zemans for his helpful comments on issues discussed in this paper. 
This article is available in Osgoode Hall Law Journal: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol55/iss1/7 
225
Three Objections to Forum of Necessity: 
Global Access to Justice, International 
Criminal Law, and Proper Party
SAGI PEARI*
IN CIVIL PROCEDURE, THE PLAINTIFF is the one who initiates the litigation 
process. In which forum can he or she initiate this process? In very general 
terms, the Canadian rules of judicial jurisdiction provide the plaintiff with three 
options for jurisdiction acquisition. First, the jurisdiction can be acquired based 
on explicit agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant as to the identity 
of the forum to adjudicate the case. Second, the plaintiff can initiate the litigation 
in the forum that has the so-called “real and substantial connection” between it 
and the parties’ specific interaction under the given ground of liability (i.e., tort, 
contract, and so on). Finally, the jurisdiction can be acquired in the forum of the 
present location of the defendant.1 
*  LLM, SJD (University of Toronto); Visiting Scholar and Adjunct Faculty, Osgoode Hall Law 
School. I am indebted to Professor Frederick Zemans for his helpful comments on issues 
discussed in this paper.
1.  Club Resorts Ltd v Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17, [2012] 1 SCR 572 [Club Resorts].
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Thus, for example in the case of a contract signed between an Ontario resident 
with a German resident, signed in Ontario with respect to delivery of goods in 
Brazil, the German resident has the option to sue the Ontario resident for breach 
of the contract in: an Ontario court (the place of contract formation and the 
present location of the Ontario resident at the time of contract formation under 
the “real and substantial connection” test); in Brazil (the place of contractual 
performance under the “real and substantial connection” test); New York 
(if that is the place of the Ontario resident’s present permanent residence); 
or even in England (if the parties explicitly included in their agreement a so-called 
“jurisdiction clause” that in case of a dispute between them, the case will be 
adjudicated in an English court).    
The doctrine of forum of necessity (“Necessity”) offers the plaintiff a fourth 
option of jurisdiction acquisition. According to this option, none of the above 
grounds are required to establish jurisdiction: neither an explicit forum choice, 
nor a “real and substantial connection” with the forum, nor the present location 
of the defendant. Rather, Necessity provides the plaintiff with the option to 
acquire jurisdiction over the defendant based on certain circumstances related to 
the plaintiff’s inability to acquire jurisdiction over the defendant elsewhere across 
the globe. In other words, Necessity grants the plaintiff the right to sue because 
of some objective obstacle the plaintiff would encounter elsewhere. Thus, for 
example, under Necessity, the Ontario court would consider a German plaintiff’s 
claim with respect to a contract between her and a French resident for delivery of 
goods in Brazil. This is without a jurisdiction clause in their contract pointing to 
Ontario as the place for any future litigation, and without the parties or the cause 
of action (the contract) having any relation to Ontario. What would matter in 
this case are the obstacles that the German resident could have encountered in 
suing the French resident elsewhere in the world, specifically in such potentially 
relevant places for jurisdiction acquisition as: France, Germany, Brazil, or other 
jurisdictions based on the forum choice provision that the parties could have 
incorporated into their contract.
Canadian jurisprudence has generally been receptive of Necessity, viewing it 
as an independent, residual ground for judicial jurisdiction acquisition. Indeed, 
Necessity has been explicitly adopted in the provinces of British Columbia and 
Nova Scotia under the auspices of the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer 
Act (“CJPTA”),2 it appears in article 3136 of the Civil Code of Québec,3 and seems 
2. See Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, SBC 2003, c 28, s 18(2)(b); Court 
Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, SNS 2003, (2nd Sess), c 2, s 19(2)(b).
3. Art 3136 CCQ. 
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to be destined in the future to be elaborated upon and developed by the Supreme 
Court of Canada, according to the Club Resorts case.4 Necessity appears to have 
received solid support from academic scholars in Canada,5 and appears well 
accepted within various systems around the world.6 While acknowledging the 
presently high threshold for the actual application of Necessity within Canadian 
courts,7 scholars have been clearly in favour of the doctrine and support its further 
development, extension, and expansion to a variety of cases.8 Necessity seems to be 
one of the future fundamental building blocks of Canadian judicial jurisdiction.
The following discussion aims to raise some serious concerns about the very 
plausibility of Necessity as a legitimate ground for jurisdiction acquisition. It raises 
challenges to the incorporation of Necessity within Canadian jurisprudence and, 
subsequently, raises concerns about the suggested extension and expansion of 
the doctrine. In this way, I applaud the province of Saskatchewan, which has 
chosen not to incorporate Necessity within its CJPTA adoption process.9 Briefly 
stated, the objections to Necessity (and its extension) can be structured around 
the following three interrelated lines. First, the adoption of Necessity means 
a mischaracterization of the nature and scope of the domestically developed 
principle of “access to justice.” Second, Necessity challenges the division between 
private international law and international criminal law which de facto leads to 
the conceptual collapse of Necessity into the doctrine of “universal jurisdiction.” 
4. Club Resorts, supra note 1 at paras 59, 86.
5. See e.g. John McEvoy, “Forum of Necessity in Quebec Private International Law: C c Q  art 
3136” (2005) 35:1 RGD 61 at 111-12 (supporting further extension of Necessity in the 
context of financial difficulties of litigating parties); Vaughan Black, Stephen Pitel & Michael 
Sobkin, Statutory Jurisdiction: An Analysis of the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act 
(Toronto: Carswell, 2012) at 154-89 . 
6. Chilenye Nwapi, “A Necessary Look at Necessity Jurisdiction” (2014) 47:1 UBC L Rev 211 
at 213-27; Arnaud Nuyts, Study of Residual Jurisdiction: Review of the Member States’ Rules 
concerning the “Residual Jurisdiction” of their courts in Civil and Commercial Matters pursuant 
to the Brussels I and II Regulations (Brussels: European Commission, 2007) at 83-86, online: 
<ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/study_residual_jurisdiction_en.pdf>. 
7. Michael Sobkin, “Residual Discretion: The Concept of Forum of Necessity Under the 
Uniform Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act” (2018) 55:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 203 
(mentioning “Canadian courts have so far viewed the threshold for assuming jurisdiction on 
the basis of forum of necessity as high” at 205).
8. Ibid at 215 (seemingly supporting a liberal interpretation of Necessity as referring to 
circumstances in which the plaintiff simply cannot “reasonably” acquire jurisdiction in a 
foreign system). Sobkin suggests extending Necessity to circumstances of the “necessary 
and proper party” (ibid at 215); to a “broader range of cases” (ibid at 213); and to cases of 
discrimination within a foreign system (ibid at 214).  
9. On the reluctance of the province of Saskatchewan to adopt Necessity within its CJPTA 
adoption process, see Black, Pitel & Sobkin, supra note 5 at 174-77.
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Third, in contrast to what one might argue, Necessity is not an appropriate vehicle 
for rehabilitation of the traditional jurisdictional doctrine of “proper and necessary 
party.” The following sections elaborate on each one of the objections in turn.
I. OBJECTION ONE: GLOBAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE
The “access to justice” principle is a good place to start the journey towards 
making a case against Necessity. It is evident that the defenders of the doctrine 
have relied on this principle as an ultimate justification for its very existence 
and its future expansion.10 The greatest difficulty with this position lies in its 
underlying presumption that the domestically developed principle of “access 
to justice” can be easily extended to a global level. Indeed, “access to justice” 
is clearly central to Canadian jurisprudence.11 It signifies the justifiable desire 
to address some key shortcomings of the domestic dispute resolution system, 
such as shortages of judges, insufficient funding of legal aid for disadvantaged 
litigants, delays in dispute resolution, inadequate incorporation of Aboriginal 
law traditions, and other aspects of the domestic system that affect the litigating 
parties’ ability to access it.12
One might, however, cast doubt on whether Necessity should be understood 
as global access to justice and challenge the very applicability of the “access to 
justice” principle to international private interactions. It is one thing to support 
access to justice within a domestic dispute resolution system and with respect 
to domestic litigants, but it is another thing altogether to open up Canadian 
courts to foreign litigants who have no connection, or only a very weak 
connection, to Canada.
 Leaving aside constitutional challenges with respect to the nature and strength 
of the required connection between the litigating parties and the forum to meet 
the apparently constitutional grounds of the “real and substantial connection” 
10. Sobkin, supra note 7 at 218 (describing circumstances where Necessity is the “only hope 
for access to justice” at 217). The author also explicitly links Necessity to “access to justice” 
and mentions that Necessity is “concerned with access to justice.” See ibid at 222. See also 
McEvoy, supra note 5 at 111; Lamborghini (Canada) Inc v Automobile Lamborghini SPA, 
[1997] RJQ 58 at para 44, 68 ACWS (3d) 62 [Lamborghini].   
11. See e.g. Hryniak v Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7 at para 1, [2014] 1 SCR 87. 
12. On the various accounts of the “access to justice” principle developed in the domestic 
context, see e.g. Trevor CW Farrow, Civil Justice, Privatization and Democracy (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2014) at 13-17; Trevor CW Farrow, “What Is Access to Justice?” 
(2014) 51:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 957 at 959-65 [Farrow, “Access to Justice”]; Lori Hausegger, 
Matthew Hennigar & Troy Riddell, Canadian Courts: Law, Politics and Process, 2nd ed (Don 
Mills: Oxford University Press, 2015) at 67-72.
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principle,13 there are some serious conceptual difficulties with drawing a parallel 
between the contemporary domestic conception of access to justice14 and its 
global extension which Necessity de facto suggests. First, this parallel raises 
deep questions about the role and function of domestic judicial authority in its 
dealing with private international law cases,15 and what a conceptual shift from 
the “domestic” to the “international” level entails. Is there a distinction between 
the judge’s functioning when dealing with a “purely” domestic case, as opposed 
to dealing with a “private international law” case? If such a distinction exists, the 
unexplained move of the “access to justice” principle from its original domestic 
context towards the international arena is puzzling. Similarly to the serious 
objections that have been raised with respect to the possibility of extending states’ 
domestic duty to address the challenges of poverty within domestic society to a 
global level,16 Necessity needs to explain a related move from domestic “access to 
justice” towards its global vision. 
Second, Necessity seems to be incompatible with the internal rationale and 
the normative underpinnings of the Canadian rules of jurisdiction. Within the 
domestic context, the considerations of “access to justice” apply in a “neutral” 
way to both sides of the litigation process (the particular defendant and 
plaintiff), and refer to such matters of the adjudication process as reasonable 
time for trial, impartial tribunal,17 among others. Yet, extended to the context 
of jurisdiction acquisition, Necessity does something else. By allowing the 
13. Black, Pitel & Sobkin, supra note 5 at 177-85.
14. See e.g. Farrow, “Access to Justice,” supra note 12 (mentioning legal needs of Canadians and 
that “majority of Canadians do not have adequate resources to find legal assistance” at 964-65 
[emphasis added]).
15. Perry Dane addresses whether in dealing with private international law cases the functionality 
of the domestic judicial authority shall be viewed through the prisms of domestic sovereign 
representatives or as global adjudicators. See Perry Dane, “The Natural Law Challenge to 
Choice of Law” in Donald Earl Childress, ed, The Role of Ethics in International Law (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 142 at 154, n 29. 
16. See e.g. Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and 
Reforms (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008).
17. Thus, for example, Necessity has been presented in article 6(1) of the European Convention on 
Human Rights: “In the determination of his civil rights & obligations … everyone is entitled 
to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial 
tribunal.” See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221, art 6(1) (entered into force 3 September 1953). Along 
similar lines, one of the papers in this Symposium addresses the case of reasonable time 
of jurisdictional motions, which harms both the plaintiff and the defendant. See Gerard 
J Kennedy, “Jurisdictional Motions and Access to Justice: An Ontario Tale” (2018) 55:1 
Osgoode Hall LJ 79.
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plaintiff to acquire jurisdiction over the defendant in a manner unrelated to 
the rules of Canadian jurisdiction, the global access to justice of Necessity is 
questioned from the standpoint of fairness to the defendant and the defendant’s 
reasonable expectations.
The values underlying the jurisdictional rules influence their scope. Thus, 
one can argue that the value of state sovereignty is embedded, for example, in the 
abovementioned jurisdictional basis of the present location of the defendant. 
According to this understanding of the basis of jurisdiction, the sovereign is 
inherently interested in claiming authority over people who reside within its 
territory. Another value is fairness to defendants and their reasonable expectations, 
which are embedded, for example, within the “real and substantial connection” 
principle, and perhaps also its American “minimum contacts” counterpart.18 
Under this reading of the “real and substantial connection” principle, the various 
territorial connecting factors, such as place of contractual performance or place 
of business, have to be reasonably predicted by the defendant. Finally, the case 
of the explicit choice basis of jurisdiction seems to crystallize the transnational 
value of party autonomy under which the parties can (almost) freely choose the 
identity of the forum to adjudicate their case.19 
Whatever values underlie jurisdictional rules, and whatever the internal 
relations are among them, the point here is that the jurisdictional rules seem 
to be grounded in strong normative reasons. The extension of the domestically 
developed “access to justice” concept seems to violate serious considerations, such 
as fairness to the defendant and the idea of state sovereignty. This move should be 
explained and the violation of the infringed values should be justified on serious 
grounds. The next section makes some suggestions for such serious grounds. 
II. OBJECTION TWO: INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
Necessity seems to fail to make an important conceptual and practical distinction 
between private rights, criminal offences, and international criminal acts. The 
public international law doctrine of “universal jurisdiction” allows nations to 
prosecute certain human rights violations with little or no connection to the 
forum state. These offences usually refer to serious cases of human rights violations 
18. See International Shoe v Washington, 326 US 310 (1945).
19. Ralf Michaels provides an excellent recent overview of the normative foundations of 
jurisdictional rules. See Ralf Michaels, “Jurisdiction, Foundations” in Jürgen Basedow 
et al, eds, Encyclopedia of Private International Law (Northampton, MA: Edward 
Elgar, 2017) 1043. 
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that jeopardize the peace and security of the international community as a whole. 
Cases of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes are paradigmatic 
examples of such offences. Presented in these exceptional terms, universal 
jurisdiction has been preserved as a limited-scope doctrine of international law, 
primarily developed in the context of international criminal law.20 Further, even 
in this context, the scope and application of universal jurisdiction has been 
exceptionally limited. An argument against this doctrine is that it trumps the 
fundamental jurisdictional principles of state sovereignty and territoriality and 
violates defendants’ rights.21 
The use of universal jurisdiction beyond international criminal law is 
even rarer and highly debatable. In a few exceptional cases, some systems have 
incorporated limited explicit legislative provisions that have provided for the 
possibility of extra-territorial civil actions in relation to international criminal 
offences. Under the American Alien Tort Statute,22 a foreigner may, under limited 
circumstances, bring a civil action with respect to a tort committed in violation 
of the law of nations. By the same token, the Canadian Justice for Victims of 
Terrorism Act 23 enables Canadian citizens to seek civil reparation in relation to 
terrorist activity.
In light of the limited scope of the universal jurisdiction doctrine, its clear 
connection to international criminal law, and the remarkable scarcity of possible 
civil actions under this doctrine, the notion of Necessity appears striking. The 
extension of universal jurisdiction to international private law cases violates 
the fundamental notions of states’ territoriality and  sovereignty—notions 
that are already embedded in the contemporary limited vision of universal 
jurisdiction. In fact, the treatment of Necessity by Canadian courts seems to 
have clearly acknowledged this fundamental distinction between private rights 
20. See e.g. Ernest A Young, “Universal Jurisdiction, The Alien Tort Statute, and the 
Transnational Public-Law Litigation after Kiobel” (2015) 64:6 Duke LJ 1023 at 1030-37. 
Professor Young elaborates on the following key aspects of universal jurisdiction: “universal 
jurisdiction is unsettled and controversial in principle; its exercise is extremely rare in 
practice; and when other countries do employ it, it is nearly always a tool of criminal (not 
civil) enforcement. The governments do not exercise universal jurisdiction even if they 
have it” (ibid at 1037). See also Mark Chadwick, “Modern Developments in Universal 
Jurisdiction: Addressing Impunity in Tibet and Beyond” (2009) 9:2 Int’l Crim L Rev 
359 at 362-64. 
21. Young, supra note 20 at 1042-43. 
22. Alien Tort Statute, 28 USC § 1350 (2012) (also referred to as the Alien Tort Claims Act). The 
Act provides that “the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an 
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations” (ibid).
23. Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act, SC 2012, c 1, s 1. 
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and international criminal law. This explains the courts’ support of Necessity 
in relation to civil reparation of plaintiffs tortured by defendants in Iran,24 
under such exceptional circumstances as “risk of serious physical danger,”25 and 
the courts’ clear unwillingness to extend Necessity to circumstances where the 
plaintiff is financially unable to initiate proceedings.26 These observations give rise 
to an argument that would unequivocally challenge the operation of Necessity in 
the context of private law enforcement and civil actions, where there is no direct 
relation to any activity that would be regarded as an offence under international 
criminal law. Civil reparation provisions in international criminal law seem to be 
of an exceptional character, reserved for serious cases of human rights violations 
which are to be determined as such by the legislative authorities of particular 
states. Indeed, the point about the link between Necessity and massive human 
rights violations has been rightly acknowledged in the literature.27
The abovementioned comments on the division between private and criminal 
laws and the very high threshold of international criminal wrongs needed for 
jurisdiction acquisition serve as a basis for possible objection to Michael Sobkin’s 
proposal in this volume/in this Symposium to extend Necessity to cases where the 
foreign system denies the equal status of the litigating parties. While this proposal 
acknowledges that Necessity cannot simply be grounded on the inability of foreign 
courts to hear a given court decision,28 it seems to make an exception in the case 
of discrimination within a foreign system or, in Sobkin’s words, in the case of a 
foreign system “where the plaintiff would be denied access to the courts because 
of his or her ethnicity or religion.”29 One can, however, challenge this suggestion. 
The centrality of the non-discrimination principle within private international 
law should not be underestimated. Yet, an important distinction should be kept 
in mind: While the equal status of litigating parties has traditionally played a 
central role as a shield in private international law to exclude the operation of 
24. Bouzari v Bahremani, [2011] OJ No 5009 (QL) (ONSC). See also West Van Inc v Daisley, 
2014 ONCA 232, 119 OR (3d) 481 (mentioning that Necessity has been designed “for cases 
like Bouzari” at para 40).
25. Lamborghini, supra note 10 at para 44.
26. Ibid at para 48.
27. Sobkin, supra note 7 at 217. This indeed suggests that the scope of Necessity (if anything) 
should be limited to extreme cases of jurisdiction acquisition within the international 
context, rather than within the Canadian interprovincial context. While the Canadian 
jurisprudence generally does not distinguish between interprovincial and international cases, 
the exceptionally radical vision of Necessity suggests that it would be unlikely to be invoked 
in the Canadian interprovincial context.
28. Ibid at 209. 
29. Ibid at 210. 
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foreign law, foreign jurisdiction, and enforcement of foreign judgements,30 this 
principle has not served as an independent basis for primary private international 
law rules. It is one thing to disqualify the jurisdiction of a foreign forum based on 
the non-discrimination principle once the jurisdiction has already been granted, but 
it is another thing to offer the non-discrimination principle as an independent 
ground for initial jurisdiction acquisition. The paradigmatic private international 
law considerations of states’ sovereignty and states’ equality,31 the general civil 
conception of discrimination law within the internal hierarchy of international 
human rights,32 and the inherently criminal nature of universal jurisdiction all 
run against the recognition of non-discrimination law as an independent basis 
for jurisdiction acquisition. In other words, the “shields” should not be confused 
with the “swords.”33  
III.  OBJECTION THREE: “NECESSARY AND PROPER PARTY” 
AND JOSEPHSON 
One of the most troubling by-products of Morguard’s Revolution and the 
introduction of the “real and substantial connection” principle as an organizing 
30. For recent discussion of the centrality of the non-discrimination principle as a general 
disqualification doctrine for the operation of private international law rules, concepts, 
principles, and doctrines, see Sagi Peari, “Can Better Law Be Married with Corrective Justice 
of Evil Laws?” (2016) 61:3 McGill LJ 511 at 537-59 [Peari, “Corrective Justice”].
31. For a discussion of the centrality of these considerations within private international law, see 
ibid at 537-41.
32. On the relatively low status of discrimination law, as compared to international criminal 
offences, see generally Deborah Hellmann & Sophia Moreau, eds, Philosophical Foundations 
of Discrimination Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Jeremy Waldron, “Human 
Rights: A Critique of the Raz/Rawls Approach” (New York University School of Law, Public 
Law Research Paper No 13-32, 2013), online: <ssrn.com/abstract=2272745>. 
33. Interestingly however, Sobkin seems to acknowledge in his paper this paradigmatic 
distinction within private international law between “swords” and “shields.” Thus, in his 
discussion on the relation between Necessity and the forum non conveniens doctrine, 
he seems to acknowledge the difference between the fundamental step of initial acquisition 
of jurisdiction and the discretion to decline jurisdiction of the already acquired jurisdiction. 
In contrast to Necessity (where jurisdiction is requested to be granted), under the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens the jurisdiction has already been acquired and the limited evaluation of 
the quality of foreign systems/foreign processes works as a shield against foreign jurisdiction 
disqualification. See Sobkin, supra note 7 at 211. See also Black, Pitel & Sobkin, supra 
note 5 at 162-70. 
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principle of judicial jurisdiction34 has been an elimination of the traditional 
“necessary or proper party” ground of jurisdiction acquisition, which existed 
under the common law ex-juris rules.35 Under traditional common law rules, the 
plaintiff could acquire jurisdiction based on the institutional considerations of the 
unification of various proceedings. Under these considerations, cases involving 
massive air crashes, multiple litigating parties, and contributory negligence are 
paradigmatic examples of cases that are bound by a common thread, which 
has itself established an independent ground of jurisdiction. Yet, Morguard’s 
Revolution has claimed doctrinal purity of the “real and substantial connection” 
principle. Accordingly, while leaving the case of party autonomy (i.e., the case 
of explicit choice of the forum) untouched, the Revolution has eliminated the 
“proper party” institutional basis of jurisdiction as being inconsistent with the 
organizing principle of a “real and substantial connection.”
This development is unfortunate. Without delving into the normative 
structure of the jurisdictional rules that would inherently integrate the institutional 
notion of “proper party,”36 efficiency considerations seem to essentially require 
these “common thread” cases to be adjudicated within a single forum. The public 
institutional considerations of efficiency of proceedings and the convenience 
of the parties discourage the phenomenon of parallel proceedings and support 
a rehabilitation of this important category of jurisdiction acquisition.37 
34. Morguard Investments Ltd v De Savoye, [1990] 3 SCR 1077, 76 DLR (4th) 256. 
On Morguard’s “real and substantial connection” Revolution, see e.g. Joost Blom & 
Elizabeth Edinger, “The Chimera of the Real and Substantial Connection Test” (2005) 
38:2 UBC L Rev 373.
35. See e.g. Stephen GA Pitel & Nicholas S Rafferty, Conflict of Laws (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2010) 
at 81-82; Jean-Gabriel Castel & Janet Walker, Canadian Conflict of Laws (Markham, Ont: 
LexisNexis Canada, 2005) (loose-leaf revision 6:1), at 11.55-11.56.  
36. I made some comments in this direction in my forthcoming book. See Sagi Peari, The 
Foundation of Choice of Law: Choice and Equality (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2018) at 192-200. 
37. Elsewhere, I took this point further and suggested that cases of mass torts, antitrust, aerial 
disasters, and distribution of workers’ compensation, all of a strictly public nature, seem too 
remote from the underlying rationales of the traditional private international law doctrines 
and therefore should be treated conceptually differently. See Peari, “Corrective Justice,” supra 
note 30 at 533-35.
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The majority decision in the recent Lapointe decision of the Supreme Court of 
Canada indeed seems to be an encouraging step in this direction.38 
One can, however, disagree with the position that Necessity should serve 
as an appropriate vehicle for the rehabilitation of the traditional common law 
“necessary and proper party” jurisdictional category (“Proper Party.”)39 While it 
is very likely that institutional considerations indeed require a re-establishment 
of this category, using Necessity for those purposes seems to be a wrong means 
of achieving a desirable goal. Apparently, Necessity’s underlying rationale of 
global access to justice has nothing to do with the institutional considerations 
of the Proper Party category. Incorporating the notion of global access to justice 
into Canadian jurisprudence and challenging the essentials of universal criminal 
jurisdiction seems to be too high a price to pay for this desirable goal, comparable 
to making three right turns, rather than one left. The Proper Party category could 
have been simply rehabilitated through reform, without the radical Necessity 
move and an entire reorientation of private international law.
Consider the Josephson decision40 (which plays a central role in the most 
recent treatment of Necessity) both in Michael Sobkin’s work as well as in that 
of other supporters of this doctrine.41 Indeed, it is the only decision where 
the courts have accepted the Necessity argument under the provisions of the 
CJPTA.42 The decision involved third party proceedings against Idaho doctors 
for negligent treatment of Mr. Josephson. Mr. Josephson and Mr. Clark (both 
Idaho residents) had been golfing in British Columbia, when Mr. Josephson was 
badly injured. Mr. Josephson sued Mr. Clark in a BC court for negligent golf 
cart driving. Mr. Clark was seeking to join Idaho doctors to the BC litigation as 
38. Lapointe Rosenstein Marchand Melançon LLP v Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP, 2016 SCC 
30, [2016] 1 SCR 851. The case dealt with the jurisdiction question of a massive litigation 
involving 150 law firms that were added as third parties to the proceeding. Arguably, 
in such cases strong institutional considerations exist which accord paramount significance 
to the efficiency of proceedings, and trump ordinary private international law rules such 
as the jurisdictional rule of “real and substantial connection” in this particular case. These 
institutional considerations seem to explain the majority opinion in this case, which had 
determined Ontario as the sole place of jurisdiction to address the negligence claims against 
150 law firms. The majority opinion indeed seems to provide some “hints” that would 
support this line of reasoning. See ibid at paras 50, 56, 59.     
39. Sobkin, supra note 7 (“Allowing a court to act as a forum of necessity in these circumstances 
[of Proper Party] would address these concerns” at 219).
40. Josephson (Litigation Guardian of ) v Balfour Recreation Commission, 2010 BCSC 603, 
10 BCLR (5th) 369 [Josephson].
41. Sobkin, supra note 7 at 220; Black, Pitel & Sobkin, supra note 5 at 172-74.
42. Black, Pitel & Sobkin, supra note 5 at 172.
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third parties, claiming contributory negligence on their part—which allegedly 
occurred in an Idaho hospital after Mr. Josephson’s injury. The Idaho doctors 
challenged the jurisdiction of the BC court, pointing to the weak connection 
between themselves and the case.43
One can delineate two types of considerations in support of Necessity within 
Justice Loo’s reasoning in Josephson and in Sobkin’s analysis of this case. One 
consideration focused on the potential unfairness to Mr. Clark in litigating his 
third party claim against Idaho doctors in an Idaho court. As the expert witness 
suggested, procedurally, Mr. Clark would have almost definitely lost his case 
in Idaho. Mr. Clark made several claims in this direction: (1) he did not have 
the opportunity to undergo Idaho law’s pre-litigation screening panel process 
as a condition to medical malpractice claims;44 (2) Idaho law limited liability 
for medical malpractice to patient-physician relationships; and (3) because of 
the presence of the “joint and several liability” doctrine in BC, he would be 
“on the hook for 100% of the damages.”45 Both Justice Loo and Sobkin clearly 
appeared to be sympathetic towards Mr. Clark’s arguments of unfairness, 
stressing his procedural disadvantage had the third party claim been adjudicated 
in an Idaho court.46 
With all due respect, I humbly disagree with this line of reasoning. Indeed, 
had the case been adjudicated in Idaho, the procedural disadvantages would have 
been fatal to Mr. Clark’s third party proceeding. Yet, because of the centrality of 
comity, considerations of respect, and tolerance of foreign systems within private 
international law, procedural disadvantage is simply irrelevant to the jurisdiction 
acquisition question in a BC court. These considerations have been crystallized 
through a wide range of contemporary and traditional private international law 
rules, principles, doctrines, and concepts, which are fundamentally uninterested 
in the content of foreign law (whether substantive or procedural) and any potential 
disadvantage to the litigating parties involved in the laws’ application. In this 
respect, one can mention the following key aspects of private international law: 
(1) the traditional formal and content-free structure of private international law 
43. Indeed, from the perspective of Idaho’s doctors, the case had very little or no connection to 
British Columbia: Mr. Clark, Mr. Josephson, and the doctors were all residents of Idaho, and 
the alleged doctor’s negligent treatment took place in Idaho’s hospital as well. See Josephson, 
supra note 40 at para 39.  
44. Ibid at para 72.
45. Ibid at paras 60, 72, 93 (internal quotations omitted). 
46. Ibid at paras 74, 91-96; Sobkin, supra note 7 at 222. 
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rules;47 (2) the very possibility of applying foreign substantive law in the domestic 
court alongside domestic procedural law, irrespective of any potential hurdles 
faced by the litigating parties;48 and (3) the doctrine of “juridical advantage.”49 
These are just a few examples of the formal structure of private international law 
which fundamentally abstracts from the content of foreign law and the fairness 
considerations involved in their application. Giving consideration to Mr. Clark’s 
potential disadvantages within the Idaho system seems simply to challenge the 
very foundations of the discipline. The incorporation of procedural disadvantage 
as a ground for the potential operation of Necessity would mean no less than a 
complete reorientation of the discipline.  
 There is another, perhaps stronger, type of consideration that can be found 
both in Justice Loo’s reasoning in Josephson and in Sobkin’s comments. These are 
considerations referring to the Proper Party category, which would conceive the 
Idaho doctors as the “necessary and proper party” to the proceedings between 
Mr. Josephson and Mr. Clark. As Justice Loo stated, “in the case at bar, the 
factual matrix of the third party claims is very closely connected to the claim 
initiated by Mr. Josephson. The only practical approach is for one court to hear 
all of the matters relating to the case of Mr. Josephson’s injures.”50 This type 
of public institutional consideration directs that contributory negligence claims 
be litigated within a single forum, which would justify the BC jurisdiction of 
Mr. Clark’s third party claim. These types of considerations have nothing to do 
with the advantages or disadvantages of Idaho procedural law. Indeed, the Proper 
Party doctrine is not presently part of the law but there is a place, perhaps, for 
reform that will rehabilitate this traditional common law jurisdictional category. 
Necessity (or more specifically what its incorporation would conceptually and 
practically entail) does not seem, however, to be an appropriate means for it. 
Too much seems to be at stake and we do not want to use a sledgehammer 
to crack a nut.  
47. For discussion of the inherently formal structure of traditional and contemporary private 
international law rules and principles, see e.g. Sagi Peari, “Better Law as a Better Outcome” 
(2015) 63:1 Am J Comp L 155 at 159-70.
48. On the choice-of-law question in private international law, see e.g. Pitel & Rafferty, supra 
note 35 at 206-24. 
49. On the doctrine of “juridical advantage,” see e.g. Castel & Walker, supra note 35 at 
13.19-13.21; Pitel & Rafferty, supra note 35 at 133-34.
50. Josephson, supra note 40 at para 100. See also Sobkin, supra note 7 at 221.
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IV. CONCLUSION
In the above discussion, I have challenged the very plausibility of the Necessity 
doctrine within Canadian jurisdiction. My argument is that Necessity signifies an 
unjustified extension of the domestically developed principle of “access to justice” 
to a global level and its collapse into the public international law doctrine of 
“universal jurisdiction.” The case of residual jurisdiction over international private 
law cases and civil actions requires a very high threshold, with clear relation to the 
topic of international crimes, and execution through specific primary legislation. 
Further, Necessity does not seem to be the appropriate means for rehabilitating 
the traditional Proper Party category. The provinces of British Columbia and 
Nova Scotia ought to have followed the province of Saskatchewan in its refusal to 
incorporate Necessity within its CJPTA adoption process. The good law today is 
in Saskatoon, not in Halifax or Victoria.   
